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**Title:** Experiences on Guadalcanal by Brigadier General Robert L. Spragins

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**Abstract:** Historical experiences by Brigadier General Robert L. Spragins, Commanding General of the 71<sup>st</sup> Division, in Guadalcanal, September 2, 1943. Includes sketches.

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EXPERIENCES ON GUADALCANAL

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BRIGADIER GENERAL ROBERT L. SPRAGINS

COMMANDING GENERAL, 71ST DIVISION

CAMP CARSON, COLORADO

September 2, 1943

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When I was on duty in Hawaii a short time after the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, I was asleep in the 24th Division CP. About midnight, under my window, I heard a rifle rattle. The sentry challenged with, "Halt, who's there?" The reply came back, just as energetically, "Don't shoot me, you son-of-a-bitch". The sentry made a quick estimate of the situation and he decided by the expression and tone that the man who answered his challenge was not a Jap, but an American. He didn't shoot. So it was on Guadalcanal, before we could launch an all-out attack against the Japanese, we had to make an estimate of the situation.

We had to consider the condition of our personnel and the condition of the Japanese. Two of our Divisions on Guadalcanal, the Second Marine Division and the Americal Division had seen combat. They had been exposed for some months to tropical diseases, malaria, dysentery, and dengue. The Americal Division had been in one major attack against the Jap line. The 1st Marine Division and the Americal Division had previously attacked that line and had failed to penetrate it. The Americal Division had had therefore a number of casualties plus the tropical diseases. The Second Marine Division, which had been in defensive operations, had had some casualties but not heavy, from battle. The Americal Division is an American Division which was stationed just before that time in New Caledonia. It was made up of elements of the National Guard Divisions which were left over when National Guard Divisions were changed from square to triangular divisions. The records show that, if a division is in the front line approximately three months, 80 percent of that division would catch malaria. Of the remaining 20 percent, some would have dysentery, and some would have dengue. I don't mean that 80 percent of any division at one time was incapacitated, but there were malaria patients who have recovered that had returned to the front lines. They were in a weak<sup>e</sup>nd<sup>A</sup> condition. Two of the three divisions that composed our forces (Americal and 2nd Marine Division) had suffered from these tropical diseases. The

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third, the 25th Division, was just getting off transports at Guadalcanal. We wanted to launch the attack very quickly in order that the 25th Division from Hawaii, would not come down with sickness before the attack. We wanted at least one division which could maneuver and go through the jungle. That division was the only division of the three, capable of tremendous physical effort, capable of the movement necessary to put over a hard attack. We had to consider also that we would get no further replacements.

There was no hurry in getting the Japs off Guadalcanal. Therefore, we could take our time and figure out a way of getting them off with few casualties. It was desirable to get the Japs off Guadalcanal because the Navy, which was in supreme command, decided that they wanted them off before they could go farther northwest. The island was also wanted as an ammunition and supply base.

The Japanese, on the other hand, had had the same sicknesses we had. We thought their sickness rate to be the same as in our two divisions. We learned later, however, that they had more trouble with malaria, dysentery and dengue than we. They also had beri-beri. We didn't have beri-beri which is caused by improper diet, improper food. Japanese replacements had been coming in regularly. They brought them in by submarine, destroyers and sampans at night. However, they spread their replacements throughout all their units, so they had these replacements which were free from tropical diseases scattered throughout the whole command. There were no Japanese units capable of the movement and efforts of our 25th Division.

On the Japanese side, there were three major units, the Second Division, the 30th Division and a separate brigade. The brigade originally numbered about 10,000. However, half of that force had attacked our 1st Marine Division when it first landed in August and suffered heavy casualties. They had attacked very extravagantly as far as loss of life was concerned. The Japanese had been engaged in a number of attacks and in defensive operations. Their casualties had been greater than ours.

In the front which we faced, the 1st Marine Division had previously attacked approximately half of the Japs that were facing us <sup>and</sup> had gained some ground. The 1st Marine Division and Americal Division had attacked the same line and same force that we attacked, drove the outpost in, but did not break

the Jap main line of resistance. Now, before we could launch this attack, we had to also consider the terrain. Guadalcanal is about 100 miles long from East to West, 40 to 50 miles wide in the central part. The central part is mountainous and jungle. That jungle is spotted with sabanas. Sabanas are grassy areas. The majority of the island, however, is jungle. Along the corridor, close to the coast, the terrain varies with jungle and coconut plantations.

We had Radar protection over the entire island so that we could get warning of the approach of any Jap air attack. Our Radar was almost 100% perfect after we established the Radar station at Beaufort Bay. Even with all this protection, some air raids got through without warning. In this country, we stress the practice blackouts. Hawaii has a very strong blackout. Canton is blacked out. Fiji is blacked out to some extent. Guadalcanal had none. So, the closer you get to the front the less the blackout. We had to get supplies, etc., around and if we had used no lights, the attack would have been held up; Trucks ran around the island with the lights on. When we were warned of an air attack, the lights were turned off. We did have casualties when surprise raids got through without warning. However, the small number of casualties that we got due to surprise raids getting through on us was not enough to justify a continuous blackout with its slowing effect on supply and other work in the rear. Now, we had to make an additional estimate as to the supply situation.

At the beginning of this campaign, we held a small area. (See Sketch #1). We had built two fighter strips, two landing fields for fighter planes, shown on Sketch #1 as Strip 1 and Strip 2. We captured from the Japanese, when we first landed, Henderson Field, a bomber landing field. There was under construction, fighter Strip 3. We had put a perimeter defense around our vital installations, supply bases, landing fields and so on. We had put a second all-around defense around fighter Strip #3, which was under construction, and its necessary supply installations. This fighter Strip number 3 was 10 or 15 miles east of the other vital installations. Our front line was west of the perimeter defense several miles. There were no Japanese east of our front line, except occasional infiltration parties. All of the Japanese were up to the northwest, (See Sketch #1), and they were using Esperance as a supply base.

In our estimate, we also had to consider what supplies we had available,

the types of ammunition, the amount of ammunition, the kinds of rations, and the amount of such rations that were available. We contemplated moving in the rear of the Japanese, through the jungle which would necessitate cutting loose from our supply lines with what emergency rations we had to sustain a force moving through the jungle. We found we were short of K rations, so we had to be very careful to issue it only to troops going through the jungle, and not to those supplied by jeep road and carrier in rear of our main advance. We issued C rations to the front line troops. The lines opposing were very close together, often as close as 20 yards, sometimes 30, 40 and 50 yards. Opposing lines over a hundred yards apart would be unusual. For troops in the front line, using the C ration, the only part of the mess kit allowed was the spoon. The reasons for limiting the utensils used were to reduce noise made by the soldier and to reduce sickness. Dysentery is carried by all raw water found on the island. It is found in spoiled food. Dysentery is also carried by flies from the bodies of dead japs who had a great deal of this sickness. Therefore, mess equipment would be contaminated by improperly washing, (boiled water is not available in the front lines) and by flies. Our troops got tired of C and K rations as a result but we couldn't help that. We had to protect them.

The Japanese held all of the high ground around our vital installations. (See Sketch #1). They were generally in the jungle and high ground and we were generally in the lower ground which consists of grassy areas, some jungle, and some coconut plantations. They had constant observation on us. They could see the 25th Division coming into Guadalcanal. They could also see the only new regiment of the Second Marine Division, the 6th Marines, get off the transport.

We had to surprise the enemy in some way. That reminds me of another story. Before the last World War, the National Guard was on duty on the boarder. The color of the enlisted Quartermaster hat cord was brown, similar to the color on the Quartermaster branch service caps now. The general officers were a gold hat cord similar to that worn by general officers on the service cap now. One day a general officer came along and the sentry looked at him and didn't salute. The General asked why he didn't salute. The man said, "You can't fool me, you'dd quartermaster skunk, get going." Well, the general officer was somewhat surprised at that, and so it was on Guadalcanal.

The Japanese could see what we were doing, they could see new troops coming in so we had to figure out some way to surprise them. The only way we could surprise them would be a scheme of maneuver.

At the beginning of this attack, our disposition was as shown on this map. (See Sketch #2). We didn't know where the Japanese were, except in certain places. We knew there was a line right in front of us to the West. We knew they were the 4th Japanese Infantry and the 16th Japanese Infantry, but the rest of the lines were not in close contact. (See Sketch #2). To the south, we had rather close contact and knew where the Japanese front line was. From December 5th until about January 5th, the 132nd Infantry had made an attack against the Japanese where to knock them off the high ground, from which they were observing our troops coming in. The 132nd Infantry had made a frontal attack. The 132nd Infantry drove the Jap outpost in and made close contact with the 124th Jap Infantry. At that time, we did not know whether it was the 124th Jap Infantry or not. The 132nd failed to defeat the main line. Our troops, facing the Japs were the 8th Marines, the 2nd Marines, one battalion of the 182nd Infantry and the 132nd Infantry, which had been exposed to malaria, dysentery and dengue for sometime. The battalion of the 182nd Infantry and the 132nd Infantry (part of the Americal Division) had been in offensive operations and had suffered a number of casualties. The Japanese, on the other hand, had the 124th Jap Infantry and the 228th Jap Infantry, in through here (See Sketch #3). The 228th Japanese Infantry and the 124th Japanese Infantry according to the history of the Japanese, were very formidable regiments. They had been in the campaign in Malaya, Burma, Java, and the Philippines, as well as other places. The 228th Japanese Infantry belongs to the 30th Japanese Division, as did the 230th Japanese Infantry and 229th Japanese Infantry. One of the latter were in that position. The airplanes had not picked this unit up. The 16th Japanese Infantry and the 4th Japanese Infantry belonged to the 2nd Japanese Division, as did the 29th Japanese Infantry. The 124th Japanese Regiment belonged to the Separate Brigade. Besides the front line, we had in reserve in all-around defensive position, the 6th Marines. (See Sketch #2). In the area protected by the perimeter defense, we had the 164th Infantry and the 25th Division less the 35th Infantry. The 182nd Infantry, less one battalion and the 35th Infantry were holding the perimeter defense. The

147th Infantry was covering <sup>the</sup> ~~figer~~ strip number 3, which was under construction, actually 10 or 15 miles to the east.

In order to have a front line unit that could get up and go, we decided to replace our south half of the line generally with the 25th Division. The 2nd Marine Division, in making their attack against the 4th and 16th Japanese Infantry Regiments, decided to envelope the Jap south flank. In order for them to do that, we had to bomb and shoot a hole in the Jap front line. Right in the center of the Japanese line, we put down a tremendous artillery concentration with six battalions and an air bombardment during which we dropped bombs of 100 to 1,000 pounds. Six battalions of artillery, 105's, 155 howitzers and 155 GPF's were used in that area. That was the only area that was bombarded in the way of preparation. We literally blasted a hole in the front line. We found Japanese bodies there that were killed without being hit by fragments, which means that the concussion of the bombs had killed the Japs. Some of these Japanese dead were in caves with out a hit on them, but all their clothing had been blown off by the concussion of the thousand pound bombs. There was nothing but dead Japs in the center of the line. The 2nd and 8th Marines were in the front line first and they tried to make a flank attack against the Japanese line from the hole blasted in the Jap line. (See Sketch #4). That Japanese line was held by the 16th Jap Infantry and the 4th Jap Infantry. The line of the Jap 16th Inf. was in a gulch with very straight sides, up and down, and in that gulch the Japs had dug into the sides of the precipice. They had dug caves with an opening just big enough for them to crawl into. The openings would be just on one side. In which case they would fire in one direction, and from the other caves they would fire in an opposite direction. In other words, their fire crossed (See Sketch #5). Part of them were shooting up the ravine and part of them were shooting down the ravine from the caves on both sides. (See Sketch #5). Now, the question was, what are we going to do about it. The Marines tried to come down the ravine, while holding and pushing against the front of the ravine. But they couldn't do it. There was no way for them to get the Japs out of the caves half way up the sides of the precipice. They couldn't reach them. They couldn't throw grenades up there, and they couldn't shoot them out. If 37mm guns were emplaced on the crests, the Japs would shoot the personnel manning the guns. If we tried to go down the ravine, we'd get shot up from these caves. Down on the north

end of this line, was <sup>a</sup>ditch 5 to 10 feet deep (See Sketch #4). They took an unusual position here, got right into the bottom of the ditch with the same type of caves -- a hole just big enough for a little man to get into, and they fired out of these caves. All along the Jap side was a series of caves, holes through which they could shoot. (See Sketch #5). They had only a very limited field of fire, and they all fired in one direction, obliquely to the sea. We approached the ditch, got up to the bank and could shoot with a range of 10 yards. When we reached the top of the ditch, the soldiers would shoot to the front. When they did that, all they did was hit the side of the cave. The opening was at the end. The only way you could shoot into the cave was to go to the edge of the ditch, turn obliquely and shoot that way. Naturally, the men don't think of that. They got to the edge of the ditch, then the Japs shot us from behind from a number of caves behind us. The 8th Marines didn't get by the ditch there.

Remember, the 8th Marines and the 2nd Marines had been subject to Malaria and dysentery for a long period. They were weakened. So we decided to relieve them with fresh troops. We put the 6th Marines on the right and the 182nd Infantry on the left. Also, we took the 147th Infantry off the landing field under construction and replaced that unit with other units from the front line.

The 27th Infantry, on the morning of the attack, passed through the front line of the 2nd Marines. The 8th Marines were relieved by the 6th Marines. The 8th Marines and the 2nd Marines were withdrawn to constitute a Corps Reserve and also to guard the vital installations in rear. The 35th Infantry and the 25th Division were moved up at night so as not to unduly alarm the Japanese or let them know what we were going to do. The 35th Infantry replaced the 152nd Infantry. (See Sketch #6).

The 152nd Infantry had tried to drive out the 124th Jap Infantry without success. So, we had to pull a scheme of maneuver which would surprise the Japs. We sent patrols all through this jungle to the south and west of the Jap 124th Infantry. We found out where the Japs were not. We didn't want to know where they were, but where they were not. We were not to fight them from the front, but surround them. So, with the 35th Infantry, we marched through the jungle, came up and surrounded the Japanese 124th Infantry. (See Sketch #7). Our plan with the 35th Infantry was to go straight through the jungle, avoiding all trails



and come out in the vicinity where we estimated the Jap reinforcement and supply trail as well as their line of retreat had to be. From the sections of trail that we found on aerial photographs, we decided that the trail must follow the approximate line shown on Sketch #7. We had guessed within 25 yards at the point where we cut the trail. We set up an all-around defense here around the trail. The first thing we hit was the Japanese Regimental Command Post. We captured a map there. This map showed the exact disposition of the 124th Jap Infantry. That helped us a great deal. That map was sent straight back, and quickly, to the Corps Headquarters where we had an interpreter. He interpreted the map and got it back to our 35th Infantry before darkness. All of the circular line surrounding the Jap 124th Infantry had to face in both directions to meet a Jap attack from either direction. (See Sketch #7). This disposition was made as soon as the circle was formed. The 35th Infantry, in moving straight in the jungle was on K rations. They had to chlorinate water. It had cut loose from the supply lines and it had left the road. So, we had to figure some way to get food and supplies to them. We had to capture this sabana (See Sketch #7) (sabana just west of Jap 124th Infantry) in order to drop supplies from the air to our 35th Infantry which we did. The battalion of the 182nd Infantry, which was somewhat out of contact, had engaged the 124th Jap Infantry on their front line and our 35th Infantry, along their front had done likewise, so as not to have them (the Japs) looking to the rear while we slipped around behind them. (See Sketch #7). We completely surrounded them except for a little area to the north where streams join. Between the battalion of the 182nd Infantry and the 35th Infantry there was a gap which they had failed to close. Our 161st Infantry was immediately available, so we took elements from this unit and moved them down into this gap and made contact with the battalion of the 182nd Infantry and the 35th Infantry, thus closing the gap.

We didn't want to lose any personnel. We didn't want any more casualties than necessary. We weren't getting replacements at all in the first place so we couldn't afford to lose any men; and if we can use our heads and save casualties, we always want to do that. Instead of attacking these people, we put down a very heavy concentration of artillery. We had to hit smack bang in the middle of the circle and then creep out to the enemy lines. This was a delicate problem and it was handled very well. After the bombardment ceased we placed a loud speaker on the hill and we made a speech to them in that pocket in Japanese. We told them that they were surrounded and that we had just given

them a little taste of bombardment. We said we would now give them a chance to surrender and that we'd treat them kindly and all that. One man sneaked out of their pocket and surrendered. Nobody else. We got only one man. However, he was very valuable. When that man came out and surrendered, he verified the position of every Jap unit that was shown on the map. He gave us more detail than the map did. We tried to persuade him to go back and tell the others that we didn't do anything to harm them. We didn't cut off their ears, or noses, or anything. The Japs had been taught that we would torture them. We wanted to send this one man back, but he said, "The fellows would kill me if I went back. They kill all those who wish to surrender." "All right then", we said, "this loud speaker is away from them, tell them over it how you are." "Oh, no," he went on, "they might whip you Americans and catch me. They will kill me and torture me before they kill me if I told them I had surrendered." We couldn't get a thing out of him as far as getting the rest to surrender was concerned. We gave them another bombardment. We closed in the circle and tightened in around those fellows as much as we could without making an all-out attack with the infantry. (See Sketch #8).

Here's why we didn't want to make an attack against them, even from the rear. The Japanese positions had all around defense. Our positions must have it. These positions are like porcupines. (See Sketch #9). No matter which direction you attack, you get fired on. Each one of the dug-outs has just one opening and they are inter-supporting. Out to the front of every one of these porcupine nests they have some boxes that let us pass by and then shoot us in the rear. To run into a porcupine is a right hard proposition. The best solution was to block them from their food and water and shoot them up with artillery. You may wonder why we didn't use the air. There was no clear terrain feature at which we could aim. Where the ground is covered with jungle it all looks the same, and the airplane can't help you. In order for the airplanes to support you, there must be a river bank, edge of a savana, or some easily distinguishable terrain feature which can be picked up from the airplane as it flies over. In this case, we had no such distinguishing mark. Our lines were in a circle and the airplane couldn't tell whether they would drop the bombs on our lines or the Japanese. The artillery could. The artillery observers were right at the front line with the infantry, they fired right in the middle of the circle and moved their fire out until it was effective against the Japs and did not fall on our troops.

In order to keep the Jap 228th Infantry from coming against this circle, we had to do something more than just face in that direction. We didn't know it was the 228th Jap Infantry at that time but we knew they were there. (See Sketch #10). With the 27th Infantry, we passed through the 2nd Marines and moved out on to the sabana to the south. We intended to engage any Japanese troops along that line and keep them fully occupied so as to prevent them from attempting to rescue the 124th Jap Infantry. A second reason for keeping these Japs occupied facing north, was to allow our troops to move to their rear through the jungle and prevent their retreating until we were ready for them to retreat. With the 27th Infantry, we moved through the hole we had blown in the Jap line and through the 2nd Marines to engage these Japanese. (See Sketch #10). The first contact we had was on a hill, partially on the sabana and partially on the jungle. Moving up on that hill, we moved straight toward it, we came under heavy mortar bombardment. Our troops used their heads very well in this situation. This battalion of the 27th split into two halves and went around the mortar bombardment, made close contact with the Japanese, but didn't charge them. They had been told not to charge them, but to find them and tell us where they were. We then would knock them out with artillery and air. They did a very fine job and told us exactly where the Japs were.

They made contact and kept the Japanese engaged and we gave them a terrific air and artillery bombardment. We were able to put air in here because the Japanese were on the edge of the jungle and the edge of the sabana, right behind a prominent hill. Here was the prominent terrain feature, something the air could pick up easily. After the bombardment, the 27th Infantry was able to walk in with very few casualties and take that area. We had forced the Japanese back. At this time, the east flank of the 27th Infantry was not protected and although we didn't know it at the time, there was a threat on that flank. Leaving this flank open was a mistake. (See Sketch #10). The Corps representative came by and told the 27th Infantry to look out for the flank they had failed to cover. No sooner had the 27th Infantry gotten that flank covered than the threatening Jap unit popped out of the jungle and attacked the flank and rear, which had just been moved in in time.

Every time the Japanese attack, they holler "Banzai". They hollered as they ran in on the attack and again our rifles mowed them down. When he hollers "Banzai", the Japanese think everybody is going to run, but we didn't run and they were mowed down as they charged. The charge was not well

coordinated. It was made by a succession of small units charging from different points. Our men were able to concentrate the M-1 on first one group and then another. There were a great number of Jap casualties. Then we continued to cover that flank and make contact with what Japs were left. Then we moved further with the 27th Infantry into the mountains to contact them and keep them engaged.

The 3rd battalion of the 27th Infantry moved through the hole we had blown in the line and established a line on the west flank to prevent the Japs from coming through. They had to cover this line, hold the hill and keep the Japanese engaged as we wanted to go down to what we called "horses' head". The sabana looks like a horse upside down. We sent another battalion of the 27th Infantry between the lines already established toward the horses' head. (See Sketch #10). Moving down, they struck Japs on the horses' neck on the geographic crest of a hill, on a grassy area, right out in the open. We didn't know the Japs were there until we hit them. They had moved out of the jungle and gotten up on the horses' neck when they saw we were advancing there. They had dug foxholes about the size of an office waste basket. They were small, but the Japs are small men and they don't stand up in their foxholes. They draw their knees up under their chins and put their rifle over their knees with it pointing out through the hole. They are doubled up like jack-knives, and you can barely see their heads sticking out. If they don't want you to see their heads, they duck them down between their knees. They were in foxholes across the neck of this horse. (Remember, we told our infantry to find where they were and let us know and we'd bomb them with artillery and air. Up on top of this grassy ridge, it was a little difficult to adjust with artillery, however, we could have shot over and crept up on them or we could have bombed them from the air on that position. This battalion made a very brave move, it made contact with the Japanese and charged with the old Gettysburg charge - just got up and ran at them. It cost us some casualties and it cost the Japanese some casualties but we took the hill. If they had cautiously reconnoitered there, located the Japanese, and reported as they were told, we could have put artillery and air on them. We could have saved the lives of some of our men lost in this charge. We were much superior in both air and artillery.)

Now, the 27th Infantry was generally in the position shown in Sketch #11. They had these Japanese all engaged and there wasn't very much chance of them hitting the rear of the 35th Infantry circle. At the same time, we wanted to

encircle the 228th Japanese infantry without paying the cost of a direct attack. From the 35th Infantry we sent one battalion straight through the jungle on K rations with no line of supply to this position just south of the horses' head. Its mission was to cut the supply trail of the 228th Jap Infantry. We knew it (the trail) left the beach road in the vicinity of the Paha River. Since it didn't cross any of the sabanas, we knew it had to run through the jungle in approximately the same places shown in Sketch #11 in order to supply the troops in the areas shown.

The battalion of the 35th Infantry sent to the horses' head set up an all-around defensive position across the supply trail which proved to be in the exact place calculated. We wanted to get astride of that supply trail which was the trail over which they would retreat and over which reinforcements would have to come. This unit got through the jungle and got in position, but never made contact with the enemy at all. The Japs engaged at the front, didn't realize we had gone behind them. Now, we had the unit more or less surrounded. If he had wanted to and had thought about it, he could have gotten out in the jungle to the south and moved around us. It would have been a hard move, also he didn't know we were on the supply trail. He stayed in the jungle defending to the north. We now sent elements of the 161st Infantry and struck the 228th Japanese Infantry in the flank, driving them in the direction of the block established by the battalion of the 35th Infantry. (See Sketch #11). When the 161st came in to the flank of these unorganized Japanese, they (the Japs) started to move west. These fellows had already been whipped on their counter-attack. The first unit hit by our 161st Infantry were the only ones that were disorganized and these disorganized fellows retreated running into the next Jap unit west of them. All of them tried to pull out. (See Sketch #12). They struck our block, the 35th Infantry, and couldn't get any farther. When they were out of the holes and caves and had struck our block, we concentrated five battalions of artillery and shot just ahead of the 161st Infantry, catching the Japanese above ground. That artillery concentration catching the Japanese out of caves, blew them all to pieces. We couldn't count the bodies as they were too badly blown apart. We found heads, arms, legs, but they were mostly blown to bits. We had hit them with five battalions of artillery in a very, very small space. The 161st Infantry had very little trouble driving them west. The 35th Infantry had less as a high cliff held the Japs from breaking to the south, but the 27th Infantry had some trouble.

At two o'clock in the morning, the Japanese tried to break out. Again they didn't coordinate their attack. They didn't use brainwork. They made an attack directly down that trail, struck the block of the 27th Infantry. Here there was a certain amount of panic. Our men got a bit alarmed when the Japanese came hollering Banzai and charging at two o'clock in the morning. They got war hysteria, shell-shock, or whatever you want to call it. A couple of our men broke, started to yell and run away. They started to run back toward the west, and there was nothing there to hit but Japanese. We had a couple of good non-coms in there and the non-coms got up and grabbed these men and shook them into consciousness or into unconsciousness, I don't know which; at any rate the line held. If those two non-coms hadn't taken hold of that situation very quickly, there might have been disorder and the whole of the 228th Jap Infantry could have escaped, and we would have had to fight them clear along the coast. The panic of two or three men would have completely wrecked all the good work that had been done had it not been for the prompt action of the two or three non-coms.

When the panic broke, there was a sergeant or a corporal, and two men holding that whole trail. All three of them were wounded. Their light machine gun was knocked out of action, but they stayed in position and fought with hand grenades and rifles. Finally, the senior one sent a message back to the platoon leader telling of the situation, stating that the panic had broken there and that nothing was left there but a broken light machine gun and three wounded men. One of the wounded men went back and the other two men fought with hand grenades and bayonets and held back several times their number of Japanese. The Japs didn't get through. The 228th Jap Infantry was blown to bits.

The Jap 124th Infantry really put up a fight and didn't give ground at all. They stood right in their position and fought. We kept closing in on them and they would get panicky and charge our lines, but they didn't organize their forces. They charged by small groups here and there, which would get shot up quite badly. We thinned our lines to the northeast, thinking they would try to get out on the other side. About 30 men broke out on our side through the gaps where we were holding the line thinly. These 30 men created quite some disturbance. They first attacked the 35th Infantry Command Post. They disorganized this command post and then went back into the jungle. Then they attacked an artillery battery and put it out of commission for a while. There is a point about all-around

defense. The 35th Infantry Command Post had to have it. They weren't as well organized as they should have been, but they got through all right. When they (the 30 Japs) had the artillery battery upset, they went back and attacked the 25th Division Command Post, which created quite a bit of confusion. All of the men did as they pleased. The 25th Division Command Post was not properly organized for all-around defense as each man didn't know what he was supposed to do. Some men ran behind boxes and returned the fire, others hid under palm leaves. They didn't know what to do. Some jumped into slit trenches thinking it was an air attack. There's no question about it, that was just excitement. One sat in his tent and continued to typewrite. He showed a lot of coolness, if that is what he should have done. It is rather courageous for him to sit there and continue to typewrite while all this firing was going on around the Command Post. These 30 Japs disrupted the Command Post and then went back into the jungle and jumped on an ammunition dump. The ammunition dump was not organized for defense either. They were not accustomed to have Japanese jumping on top of them clear back there in the jungle. The Japanese will infiltrate through, whether on offensive or defensive. Be ready to meet them. See that each man knows what part of all around defense he ought to take. See to it that each man knows his job.

Still, the 124th Japanese Infantry was holding out. However, the 228th Japanese Infantry was eliminated.

Now, as I told you, the attack of the 2nd Marine Division had not gone far. They weren't able to get down that gulch, with the precipitous sides, to get the Japanese out of there. They didn't know that there was a reserve unit in rear of the Jap lines, but they did know we had a hole in that line. The Japanese held the high ground in back of their line overlooking their main line of resistance in the gulch and ditch. We went down to the 2nd Marine Division CP and discussed a new scheme of maneuver. This time we talked the new scheme over and decided that as long as they couldn't take the ravine frontally, to surround them as we did the 124th Jap Infantry. The 2nd Marine Division decided to attack through the gap blown in the line to the rear and take that high ground. (See Sketch 13). As this attack progressed, the Marines made contact with the Jap reserve unit and a fight started. When the Japs in the gulch heard the fighting to their rear, they immediately became concerned.

The Japanese High Command had told them to hold their positions at any cost. That played into our hands with the Japs 124th Inf. and enabled us to

go ahead and surround them. It played into our hands in surrounding the 228th Jap Infantry. The 228th Jap Inf. had disobeyed orders but only after a struggle. Here the Jap 4th Infantry disobeyed the orders just as soon as they heard fighting back of them. They started running down the ravine to the north. We started moving 37's into the high ground to shoot right down that ditch. As they were climbing out of their defense caves and were running down the ditch, we piled the ditch full of dead Japanese. As those in the precipitous gulch piled out of the gulch into the ditch, we got them too. The ones we didn't get right in the ditch started to go down the corridor and we got them in considerable numbers. Some got out of the ditch and got back to the rear. They all had to leave the gulch and ditch because they couldn't get food or water.

Now, we figured on pushing straight west, down the corridor with the 2nd Marine Division, having gotten by the most difficult line. We thought the going would be a little faster now. It was, we had guessed right. We thought the 2nd Marine Division would go faster than the 25th Division which was in better physical condition. The 25th Division had to travel through difficult terrain for a distance of six miles. The 2nd Marine Division had only 6,000 yards to travel over relatively easy terrain. (See Sketch #14).

We had instructed them (2nd Marine Division) to cover their left flank successively by taking units in back of the front and shooting to the southwest to make sure that the left flank was covered against an attack by the Japanese from the south. As they pushed forward, they had to go into a box shape. Our plan involved having the 27th Infantry attack to the west, south of the 2nd Marine Division. The 161st Infantry was not heavily engaged in driving the 228th Jap Infantry into the pocket and they were in a position to jump off to the west to cover the flank of the 27th Infantry and put out the Jap artillery. Now, our 27th Infantry and our 161st Infantry had disposed of the 228th Japanese Infantry. The 27th Infantry went forward with its attack and aimed right in through the line. (See Sketch #15). The idea was to surround the Japanese before the Japs got away in front of the 2nd Marine Division. We wanted to head them off with the 27th Infantry. Therefore, we had to get ahead of them and get a line (See Sketch #15) facing back east. That line had to protect its rear the same as the 35th Infantry had to do. So we sent the 27th Infantry to head the Japanese off. As we moved forward, the 6th Marines and the 182nd Infantry lost contact in the jungle. We, therefore, had to take the reserve of the 2nd Marine Division, the 147th Infantry, to fill the gap between the 6th Marines and the



and the 182nd Infantry. The Marine Division was supported throughout by their organic artillery and the Americal Division Artillery. 14th Corps was supported by the 14th Corps Artillery, the 25th Division by the 25th Division Artillery. The Americal Division also gave artillery support for that action with the 124th Jap Infantry.

As the 27th Infantry moved forward in their attack to pocket these Japs, elements of the 182nd Infantry which were passed through by the 27th Infantry came back into reserve of the 2nd Marine Division and reconstituted the reserve. The 27th Infantry were going west (See Sketch #15) when they struck a Japanese reserve which must have been the 230th Jap Infantry or 229th Jap Infantry. It was never identified. The 27th Infantry did a very fine job, it didn't become entangled with that reserve, but put a small force in there to contain it and went right ahead. We shot north here with the 27th Infantry and established our line along the Pohg River driving out elements of the 29th Japanese Infantry. We established our line facing north and northwest (Line A) to keep the Japanese from coming in on the rear of Line B. (See Sketch #15). The Japanese in the 2nd Marine Division box were either killed or driven out when our lines were there in that position shown on Sketch #15. As the 27th Infantry and the 6th Marines got there, they were very close together with the Japanese in between. The 27th Infantry was along the south.

That unit which was being contained by the 27th Infantry decided it was time for them to move before other of our forces got in on them. They broke contact with our units and went through the jungle under cover of darkness someplace else.

Our 161st Infantry having put out that artillery and having advanced straight through the jungle to cover the flank of the 27th Infantry, was told to establish a series of all-around defenses and to continue to cover the flank of the 27th Inf. (See Sketch #15). From these defense posts, they are somewhat separated, it was necessary to send patrols out between them as some Japanese might be coming out of the jungle to intercept the supply road in the rear of the 27th Infantry. We ran a jeep road there (See Sketch #16) and that road had to be covered with a series of all-around defense positions. Now, all of those circles according to the British reports should be in close contact. However, the British were on the defensive and we were on the offensive. Notice the similarity of the method that we used in covering that flank and the similarity of the study of the British as a result of the Malayan operation. We didn't know anything about Circular 55 when we undertook this operation. We have all-around defense to cover the supply

road to the 27th Infantry and to cover the flank of the 27th Infantry. We spread out our defense forces somewhat, but we didn't expect any force of Japs to strike as the British were expecting in Malaya. If the Japs hit one defensive position, we would counter-attack with two others. If we got engaged we would have to take a reserve from Corps or Division as the Navy had decided to pull out from this island the 2nd and 8th Marines. We had to get ready to turn loose the Marines. We still had some reserves to come up here and protect this movement. We also had some 2nd Marine Division reserve to reconstitute their reserve as the 27th Infantry moved up. The 161st Infantry had patrols in between their islands of defense to attack any Japanese coming through between them. We could counter-attack from these positions and drive them off. We had covered the supply routes to the 25th Division and also covered the flanks and rear of the 27th Infantry.

Now, we had a few Japanese between the 27th Infantry and the 6th Marines. We drove the 229th or 230th Jap Infantry out and we still had the Japanese 124th Infantry holding out. The artillery of the 25th Division and the artillery of the 2nd Marine Division as well as the Americal Division all had been trying to get these Japanese. The 6th Marines and the 27th Infantry were squawking to Corps to stop the other fellow's artillery from shooting into their men. Actually, our artillery didn't shoot into their own or friendly troops. We had to count on some artillery fragments from our own artillery hitting some of our troops, and they did. Our men didn't like the fragments, but they just have to realize that it is impossible to fire close without their getting some fragments. The Japanese got a lot more fragments than we do from our artillery. We told the 27th Infantry in reply to their request to have the artillery cease shooting into them, that we were sorry, but they'd just have to duck their heads. We had to shoot the Japanese. In order to get those Japs and not hit our own troops with direct hits, we had to adjust the artillery in the Pacific Ocean and creep in on the Japanese until we got them. (See Sketch #16). Again the artillery did very fine work. We got that bunch. Nearly all dead but we got them. We may have gotten a few of our men wounded from our own artillery but we did the job. A few casualties but no deaths. We got some mortar fire from the Japs but not much.

There were three types of artillery adjustments I have given you, here is the fourth one. When the lines are close together, you've got to shoot out beyond your line and creep back on it. That is, by shouting in the rear of the

of the Japanese line and coming back. It's not so unusual in the jungle fighting to shoot in the middle and then spread out. The bombardment of the Jap 228th Infantry was somewhat unusual, because we had to shoot in front of our 161st Infantry and creep up on the enemy without hitting our trail block out in front and without hitting the 27th Infantry on the north side. It took rather accurate firing. After the bombardment of these people, we eliminated them.

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Still the 124th Jap Infantry was holding out. We used a tremendous artillery concentration on them. They made a series of panicky attacks. They made a night attack, in which the Jap commander assembled a group of his lower commanders to issue orders. The verbal orders issued by the commander carried very well. Our men did a very good piece of work there. Just before the Japs charged to get out of that circle, our men threw grenades in that crowd. They killed quite a few. Out of this circle, about 100 men got away safely. We couldn't use air bombardment because that unit was too close in between our lines. While there was a terrain feature on one side of the Jap 124th Infantry that the air could adjust on, there was no terrain feature on the other side where we had troops. The troops were too close together to use the air on them anyway.

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Now, in one of your training documents, it says the air service can more or less take the place of artillery. That's not true. The air service cannot render support in the jungle similar to the artillery. Air service can fire on a place that's clearly marked by terrain features. Air can render support when the enemy is on the bank of a river. For the air, the targets must be clearly marked out.

The air can do a fine job of counter battery. Artillery has to find a clearing in the jungle to keep the projectiles from striking the jungle trees and exploding prematurely. Guns are pointed out of the small openings in the jungle. These guns make a blast when they are shot. If an airplane is kept up on continuous air surveillance, with radio equipment, that plane can radio to the bomber crew to come and get him I've found him. As far as close support in jungle attack, they cannot give you that support except in occasional cases, some of which I have mentioned.

We now figured we had about broken up the main Japanese resistance. The Japanese High Command had made a mistake by telling the Japanese to hold to the last which allowed us to surround them. If they had withdrawn to successive positions, in the rear, we would have suffered a great many more casualties and we wouldn't have gotten the Japanese off Guadalcanal for many months instead of

30 days. Had the Jap fought a delaying action around the island, we could have shortened the fight by using our navy and air superiority to send an expedition to his rear and cut him off from further retirement. This would have shortened the length of that possible long campaign; however, it would not have been as short as our operations. Our estimate of the Japanese made it short, we figured correctly as to what he would do. When we captured the order saying hold to the last, we knew for sure. And that pleased us immensely.

Now, remembering what our mission was, we couldn't afford to abandon the air fields nor could we afford to neglect to protect our supply installations and beaches on which we were getting food and ammunition. Yet, we wanted to get the Japanese off of Guadalcanal. We couldn't afford to forget what we had to protect, especially our airfields, for if the Japanese took them, they would have air supremacy and we would have lost most of that which our forces had won to date. We also had to be ready to meet any incoming Japanese reinforcements that might be on their way. We pulled the 25th Division out to meet any Japanese reinforcements and put them in the Corps Reserve to defend beaches, airfields, etc., leaving elements to hold the Jap 124th Infantry. The 2nd Marine Division continued the attack. We hoped the Japanese reinforcements would come in, but they didn't.

Having whipped the Jap, we ordered the 2nd Marine Division up the corridor in pursuit. They had been told to advance with a battalion in the lead on a comparatively large front. They were to have in front of this battalion an advance guard, besides a series of flank guards to protect their left flank. That would require a good many flank guards every thousand yards or every 500 yards depending upon the thickness of the jungle.

We thought that we had whipped the main Japanese troops pretty well. The Jap fought a delaying type of action on the Mamara River, the same thing as on the Pohna River. He had failed to defend a good position which he could have defended. This all showed that the Japs were not going to land more troops and as we go along we get further confirmation. They were fighting a delaying type of action close to their own supply bases and close to landing beaches. If they were expecting reinforcements, they would have held defensively and yelled, "come on with your landing party and your reinforcements." But they didn't do it.

The 6th Marines were replaced by the 147th Infantry. The 147th Infantry went down the corridor like a house a fire. They went so fast that the flank guard couldn't keep up with them and as a result their flank was exposed.

When they got near the Bonegi River, they ran into a good ambush. The Japs were up in the jungle on their flank. The Japs were across the Bonegi River with an outpost on our side of the river and had snipers up in the palm trees behind them. They were completely boxed in except for the Pacific Ocean. There are <sup>(live)</sup> no Japs in the Pacific Ocean. (See Sketch #17).

The 147th Infantry did a very nice job here, they got into a situation, but they took it all right. They suffered a number of casualties due to letting their flank guard fall behind. They didn't replace it often enough, or maybe they tried to rush too fast down the corridor. Better coordination was needed. The 147th Infantry was in a bad situation, there were Japs on all sides, but they didn't know where the main Japanese line was. To find the Jap line, a detachment of the 147th Infantry went up the flank near the Pacific Ocean. The Japanese let them go past their (the Jap) outpost and didn't even open up on them. Our men jumped behind a gravel bar and kept on watching until they located where the fire was coming from. Across the Bonegi River, finally, a Japanese machine gun nest on the left was located. With observation straight up the river, the patrol could see the edge of the jungle where the main line was located. Our detachment kept watch up there until they got the location of the main line and located the Jap left flank accurately. Part of the detachment slipped out in <sup>(to)</sup> ocean, came around the Japanese outpost position and brought information back. They then directed mortar fire on the left flank of the Japanese position, putting out the machine gun nest. The first shot with a 60mm mortar was a hit. Actually it was 10 yards short but hit in the water and the fragments sprayed beautifully up on the bank. The second was 15 yards short, and the third shot was a direct hit. We put the mortar fire on there to get the rest of the detachment out. The regimental reserve went to the rear, struck the flank of this Japanese resistance which was infiltrating on our position. Part of them went off on a tangent, crossed the Bonegi River on the upper reaches, and came down on the enemy main defensive positions. The Bonegi was unfordable down below, but while we were making the flank movement, they engaged the Japanese 20 yards across the Bonegi River. (See Sketch #17).

Now, as this flanking detachment came down, having located the Japanese main line defenses, we put six battalions of artillery on these defenses from south to north as our envelopment moved in. The six battalions of artillery shot, in effect, a barrage to the right of our envelopment which was moving on a narrow front. It was quite successful. The Japanese held the positions two

ays and one night. Evidently, they had intended to hold it until the second night and withdraw under the cover of darkness to some other place to the rear. There was a coconut plantation right in the rear of the jungle where they were located, so they couldn't safely cross the plantation if they withdrew during the day. A few tried to withdraw through the jungle and through the coconut plantation. Our artillery caught these fellows going through the coconut plantation and most of them were killed. The others held the position to the last.

Now, you remember, we left the 124th Japanese Infantry still sewed up in a pocket. They had been gradually reduced with artillery fire. Finally a Captain in the 35th Infantry got the idea to use a tank to finish up these fellows. It was hard to move a tank up there. They are not used in jungle warfare. But we put it in the jungle to get the 124th Jap Infantry. It continued to move, but it just crawled, just barely moved along. We covered the tank with our infantry so they couldn't shoot at the drive sprocket, track pins or something that would cause it to halt. They drove that tank around in there and drove right up to each one of these little Japanese dugouts and shot a 37mm gun into the holes. In one case, we came so close to the Japanese ground hog hole that we couldn't depress the gun sufficiently to shoot the gun into the hole. We had to back away a few yards to hit the Jap. We eliminated the Japanese a little quicker with the tank. They had no antitank weapons to knock it out. They had one antitank grenade that we know of. It was of the type that had two pins to pull. The Japanese got excited and just pulled one, so it didn't go off. The tank hurried up the disposal of the 124th Japanese Infantry, although we had them anyway. We had them surrounded, they couldn't get any food or water and it would have taken just a little longer to reduce them without the tank. As it was, they held out twenty one days.

The 147th Infantry was relieved by the 161st Infantry. The 161st Infantry had only been in action against the 228th Japanese Infantry against the flank after a heavy bombardment. They started going toward Cape Esperence in good shape.

We wondered as the 161st Infantry started the trip up there, if the Japs would continue to fight a delaying action. It might take years to whip them if they kept fighting the delaying action. So, we had to get in boats and go around behind the Japanese and hold them in place. Having decided on this plan we had to make a reconnaissance. We didn't want to land against heavy Japanese

resistance. We sent a patrol out to see if the Marovovo Bay was occupied by the Japanese. The patrol sent from the Radar Station at Beaufort Bay got out there and found that the bay was not occupied. So, we sent out a covering force to occupy the bay. The patrol was still watching the bay, but the Japs occupied the bay just as our covering force came up. Our covering force got shot up and was sent back and everything had to be done again. It was necessary to reconnoiter again and select another bay. The patrol had been told first to go on a reconnaissance and find out where the Japs were not. They made their report, following instructions explicitly, but G-3 of Corps had failed to transmit the first message to Assistant G-3 and when Assistant G-3 got the report he said, "We don't care where they are not, we are fighting the Japs, go back and find out where they are." The patrol engaged the Japanese and that's why the covering force got shot up. There is an example of the mistake of not transmitting messages, of not transmitting information, of not transmitting the data. G-3 had not told Assistant G-3 what he wanted and they got balled up and the covering force got shot up. The patrol found another bay unoccupied and we put the covering force in there. A battalion of the 132nd Infantry reinforced by a battalion of 75mm pack artillery of the 2nd Marines went around and landed. (See sketch #18.) This force was to advance up the shore successively until they struck a defile and struck sufficient Japs to stop them. They marched up here in a fine way. (See sketch #18.) They held a defile between the mountains and the sea and prevented the Japanese from escaping. The Japs were just fighting a delaying action all around.

The 161st Infantry crossed the Unasani River with but little resistance from the other side. In this attack by the 161st Infantry, we notified the Navy that we thought the Japs would withdraw from the island. On the night of February 1st and 2nd, in came 20 Japanese destroyers. The abandoned small boats left out in the water the next morning indicated rather plainly that the Japs were carrying on with an evacuation and not reinforcement operation. Some had been evacuated by submarine and it was evident that supplies had been brought in by submarine. Russell Island natives, 50 miles west of Guadalcanal, reported that 800 Japs had moved from Guadalcanal to Russell Islands in sampans and in a few days left Russell Islands. They were evacuating troops by sampans, destroyers and submarines. On February 4th and 5th, they brought in more destroyers, and we don't know how many sampans and submarines. There were a lot of small boats left drifting which indicated they were in a hurry to get on the

boats and get away before the Navy could catch them. On the nights of February 7th and 8th, they left the boats out there on the water again and let in destroyers. We attacked these destroyers with PT boats and suffered rather heavy casualties.

Our attack had begun on January 10th and we closed the Japs out on February 9th. There was nothing left but a few Japanese on the island. That was too bad, we should have caught them. All the Generals got away, all the ranking officers got away. But that doesn't say that the Lieutenants got away, or the Captains or the Majors, they didn't. We got the Majors, Captains, and Lieutenants and even some Lieutenant Colonels. So you see, these senior officers are a little safer than the junior officers.

Here are some of the lessons taught by the campaign. The Jap prisoner is valuable but hard to get. They are brought up to think we are heathen, that we punish, tear and cut to pieces all our prisoners. However, once captured, they talk quite freely. If they don't talk, we, of course ask them questions such as, "What's your name?" and "Where do you come from?" Generally, they will answer that correctly, but if we find they are not speaking truthfully, we tell them we will send their names back to Japan. Then, they open up for they know that if this happens, their families are punished and persecuted for the disgrace caused by the surrender of father, brother, or son. Few of our men were taken prisoner by the Japs, but one of our men who had been captured escaped and succeeded in returning to our lines. He said the Japs had treated him well and given him fish and rice to eat, the same food that they ate. He was not persecuted or mistreated in any way, but escaped because he grew tired of a steady diet of fish and rice. This case, however, is the exception to the general rule. The Japanese do not usually treat prisoners so well.

When patrolling, don't be noisy and don't bunch up. I recall going up to the pocket where the 124th Jap Infantry had been, to view what was left of one of our 10-man patrols. This patrol had evidently started out in good formation but committed one or both of the errors just mentioned. The leading men had stopped to look around and since it seemed pretty safe, the remainder also stopped to have a look in pretty much the same spot. The Jap machine gun, sited 30 yards away, wouldn't fire on one or three men but ten men all within a radius of ten feet were a good target. Don't take that chance.

One of our reconnaissance patrols saw a Japanese patrol operating in this manner. Two Japs crawled on all fours down a trail, followed at some distance



by the main patrol. If the two leading Japs were attacked, the rest of the patrol could swing out through the jungle and get around our men while they examined the dead bodies. Our men could thus be killed or captured. More than likely, the Japs wanted to take prisoners.

After we had taken the Bonegi River position, we put out another patrol which had some intelligence men with it. The patrol had found some documents in rear of the captured position and were examining them in a compact little group as G-3 and I came up to see what was going on. Gathered in a small circle, they were examining pictures taken from dead Japs of Burmese or Javanese girls in different stages of dress - or undress. They should not have congregated in such a group for any reason, so we sent them on their way -- dispersed. I being the senior officer, took the best looking pictures.

Here are several points of interest to all ranks. [The Japanese shoot a .25 caliber rifle which sounds like a .22 long. They are hard to locate as they produce very little smoke.] Their heavy machine gun is slow-firing and is not as good as our heavies. Nor are their light machine guns as good as ours. At 30 or 40 yards, their lights shoot a pattern the size of a big wastebasket, while ours will make a very small pattern. However, this gun has a high cyclic rate.

Always prepare alternate positions. When the Japs are close to you, don't remain at night in a position which you have occupied all day long for the Jap then knows where you are and will bayonet you or drop a grenade on you after nightfall. The 2nd Marines had a listening post outside the line with two men in the position in a foxhole. They failed to have an alternate position foxhole into which men would get at night. They could have gotten out of the hole and into the open. They didn't, and the Japs sneaked out that night and bayoneted them both.

In general, we had to take prisoners by force. If they didn't have malaria or dysentery or were not disabled, we had to bushwack them, jump on them and overpower them. You don't need many, but a trickling of prisoners is necessary from all over the front, in order to get the enemy dispositions. We had to physically jump on them and knock them out without killing them, all this at considerable risk to ourselves. A very few voluntarily surrendered from the pocket of the 124th Jap Infantry. When the 6th Marines at the Poha River were about to pass through the 25th Division, one prisoner came in in broad daylight singing "Tiperrary" in English. He walked right into the 6th Marine Command

Post. We questioned him, he had been back there for several days, "Now, my friend, or my enemy, or whatever you are, what have you been eating all this time?" "Where have you gotten the food?" In his broken English, he said, "I get up in the night and eat in the Officers' Mess while they eat in the daytime." So that was where he got his food.

I showed you the different combinations of the Japanese type defensive position. It might be like the porcupine nest in the ravine half way up the precipice. They are hard to attack. It is hard to go down the ravine with caves dug in the sides of the ravine with an opening so very small. We ought to have a weapon so that when we locate them, we could put them out with one or two cracks, to knock them out. There were no bazookas in Guadalcanal. I don't know whether they would have gone off against the side or the top of a Jap dugout, and if it didn't, it wouldn't get them. There is a question whether the bazooka will go off in soft dirt with logs mixed in. An ordnance officer on the general staff thought they could be made to go off and penetrate the side of the boxes. If there is nothing else to knock them out with, you can always knock them out with artillery. The old type 37 breaks down into loads, but we couldn't get this new type 37 through the jungle. You can knock out the pillboxes with direct fire, but an artillery concentration doesn't clear out a porcupine defense, it just throws fragments around and doesn't hit all the boxes. The solution may be the bazookas. Also, use your artillery in the front lines as accompanying guns.

In conclusion, I want to tell you one more story. While I was on National Guard duty in Alabama, I went quail hunting with a farmer; the dog stood the quail and the farmer started tracking with his gun through the bush along the ground. I asked him if he was going to shoot those quail running on the ground that way. "Hell, no" he said, "I'm going to wait until they bunch up." I gave you an example of bunching up. I could give you dozens of them. I want to say one of the most important things in jungle fighting is the command exercised by the squad leader, next by the platoon leader, next by the Company Commander. You have to stop this bunching up by your men. They are just like that covey of quail, they get excited and want to bunch up. They think it is safer to get together, but that's the wrong idea.

The squad leader when he is in the front line in the attack has got to control his squad. When he is in the front line, he must not continue to shoot as a private. When you get the alarm to go out and defend against infiltration,

organize like the infantry. You must have a responsible leader for every sector of the front. That leader must look around and see that the men shoot at the right target and keep looking for the Japanese, don't let them sneak in your squad while the squad is shooting in one direction. You keep looking around and don't let them sneak in from the flank. The platoon leader can't see all his platoon, and the squad leader can't see all his squad. It would be better to split the squad and give half to second-in-command and half to himself. Make him use his brain. We can whip the Japs if we use our brains. They don't use theirs so well, so we can outsmart them. Every man has to take care of his command. No higher commander, or the Division Commander can help you when you are out there in the jungle by yourselves. You are on your own and you have to control your men.

Our patrols were too noisy. They talked too loud. Natives were sent out with our men as leading elements. Pretty soon, they wanted no more of our men because they were too noisy. They even laughed out loud.

We used the bayonet comparatively very little. When you have a gun why stop to stick somebody when all you have to do is pull the trigger. It is very useful though. In one case 18 or 20 Japs from the 124th Jap Infantry got out of the pocket and started to beat it to the rear. A patrol was sent out to kill these men. The Japs didn't know they were coming. The patrol leader used exceptionally good sense. The Japs got strung out. When the patrol caught up with them, they decided not to shoot. The patrol went forward and caught 1 and 2 at a time and killed them with bayonets, from the rear to the front.

A Coast Artillery OP in Hawaii soon after December 7th reported a large and extensive air battle over that point. It was raining and foggy, yet they said it was an air battle. Actually it was a great number of our own planes coming back from reconnaissance, clearing their guns. Report got back to headquarters and the airforce was ready to take off. Report only the facts you know.

A Field Artillery OP in Hawaii reported that a battleship was off a certain point. The report went all the way back and got to the Navy. The Navy was getting ready to fight and telephoned the 24th Division to verify it. The 24th Division troops couldn't find any battleship. They went up to the OP and had the artillery observer point out the battleship and it was a lighthouse on Kaena Point. Report what you know. Don't draw conclusions.

The Marines were running a reconnaissance patrol around Oahu. One boat

hit a reef and sprung a leak and they sent word they would have to come in to the beach. "Don't shoot us." The guard reported that he saw the boat coming. The battalion commander said all right, tell him to come in. Pretty soon it got back to Division that the Marines have a battalion in such-and-such a bay and that they want to practice landing operations. An error in transmittal.

Even on offensive operation, we must be prepared for all around defense. When the 27th Infantry was moving through we were prepared for defense on the flank of the 27th Infantry. We should have been prepared all around. Every establishment must have all-around defense. You don't know where the enemy is coming.

It says in TC 55 (British), don't use wire communication. The best communication we had was wire. They were on the defensive in Malaya. The Japs could follow the wire into their position and eliminate them. But on the offensive use wire. We can follow their wire. Going through the jungle, you've got to have a limited objective attack. If you are moving along and meet the enemy, you have got to do something quickly. After lines are established you do have time to lay wire. You have got to locate your objective at which you gain control again. It is very seldom that you can turn a unit loose in the jungle. We always kept up communication with wire until the pursuit started and even then until we ran out of wire.


We took 300 prisoners. They gave accurate information of Jap positions. A very good way to make them talk was to threaten to send their names back to Japan that they had been captured. As this is a disgrace to the family at home for one of their men to be captured, the prisoners would always talk so as not to disgrace their family.

One thing which is quite important to overcome in the jungle is looseness of command. Men are often spread out and command must be taken over by platoon leaders and sergeants. In the attack on the ravine, we had one company that got up on a hill where they found a very fine water spring. It looked perfectly good. It wasn't. The whole company had to be withdrawn the next day with dysentery.

We are instructed and organized in combat teams. This is not the only way of fighting. We used one combat team operation in this maneuver. That was the water movement of the reinforced battalion of the 132nd Infantry. Other than that one operation, artillery was used massed.

SKETCH # 1

Pacific Ocean



Occupied By U.S. Forces

Occupied By Japanese

(1 in. app. 100 mi. long.)

Pacific Ocean

SKETCH No 2

BEACH DEFENSE

☐?

☒?

16th INF

4th INF

2ND MARINES

METANIKAU R.

1BN 182nd INF

6th MARINES

PERIMETER DEFENSE (1BN)

☒ 164

☒<sup>XX</sup> 25 (- 35th INF)

35th INF


147th INF AT F/S No 3

12 MILES

MT. AUSTIN


JAP MSR ESTIMATED

ALL WHITE AREAS - JUNGLE GREEN AREAS - SABANA



PACIFIC OCEAN

SKETCH No 3



ALL WHITE AREAS JUNGLE  
GREEN AREAS SABANA

JAP DIRTY

JAP SUPPLY ROUTE  
ESTIMATED

229?  
230?

16TH JAP INF


4TH JAP INF

8TH MARINES


METANIKAU R.

BN 182 INF

132nd INF REGT.




PACIFIC OCEAN




PLAN OF  
MARINES  
ATTACK




DEFENSIVE ORGANIZATION  
OF GULCH



DEFENSIVE ORGANIZATION  
OF DITCH.





# Pacific Ocean



Sketch No. 7

# PACIFIC OCEAN





SKETCH H NO. 9

Pacific

① DEER

CAPE ESPERANCE

DOMA DOVE

TASSAFARONGA

UNASANI R.



BONEG

POHAR R.


Resistance wiped out by Artillery and flank attack

Entangling fire reduced by flank action

Caught in ambush 147




# PACIFIC OCEAN



PACIFIC OCEAN


REORGANIZATION FOR ATTACK

SKETCH NO 6




# PACIFIC OCEAN

SKETCH NO. 11





Pacific Ocean.




SKETCH No 12


Pacific Ocean

Plan of attack 2nd Marine Division and resulting battle

Sketch No 13



PACIFIC OCEAN



SKETCH # 10

JAP COMMANDERS DEPOSITED DEPOSIT

182nd Bn  
35th INF.

Five FIGHT & CHANGE

LINE TO PROTECT FLANK

METANIKAU R.


PONA R.

KOKUMBONA

PACIFIC OCEAN

ACTION AS A RESULT OF PLAN ON SKETCH #14

SKETCH # 15



IAB UNIT LEAVES BEFORE 161 ARRIVES

229 2  
230 2

POH R  
Line A

18th 27th INF  
Line B

KOKUMBORIA

147th INF

6th MARINES

147th INF GAP  
182nd INF

27th INF CONTAINS JAP UNITS AND CONTINUES MISSION


6th MARINES ATTACK LOSE CONTACT WITH 182nd INF

27th INF

METANIKAU R.


161st puts out Artillery

# PACIFIC OCEAN



PLAN OF ATTACK  
AFTER PASSING  
JAP MLR IN GULCH

SKETCH  
# 14



SKETCH NO -16